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By Andrew P. Morriss, Dean of the School of Innovation 
and Professor at the Bush School of Government & Public Service 
& Charlotte Ku, Professor of Law, Texas A&M University
The Evolution Of Offshore: 
From Tax Havens To IFCs
OVER THE PAST 70 YEARS, many smaller jurisdictions have evolved into international 
 nancial centres (IFCs). Although 
di erent in their historic origins and 
in the  nancial products and services 
they o er, IFCs share a common 
development path. Understanding 
that evolution can shed light on what 
the next decade is likely to bring.
Not Being Somewhere Else
Before World War I, the international 
 nancial order was built around the gold 
standard; several relatively free trade 
zones (the British Empire, the French 
colonial empire, the American zone of 
in uence) and multinational businesses, 
including banks serving international 
businesses such as First National City 
Bank (the forerunner of Citibank), 
consumer product companies such as 
Unilever, and natural resource producers 
such as Royal Dutch/Shell. By the end 
of World War II, that  nancial order 
was shattered not only by the war but by 
Nazi and Soviet e orts at autarky, tari  
wars, the Great Depression, and the 
liquidation of UK overseas assets to pay 
for both world wars. 
 e new global  nancial order – 
constructed under the Bretton Woods 
framework established in 1944 – poured 
millions in dollars into the world 
economy through the Marshall Plan 
and US military spending abroad.  e 
United States enjoyed an export boom 
as countries devastated by the war 
bought capital goods to rebuild their 
economies. Decolonisation prompted 
reverse migration from Britain’s newly 
independent colonies, with returning 
ex-colonials seeking British banking 
and  nancial services inside the sterling 
zone, but outside the UK’s high tax 
regimes.  is demand grew in the 
1960s as top marginal tax rates soared 
in most developing economies and the 
United States began e orts to restrain 
foreign access to US capital markets 
through voluntary restraints and 
mandatory methods such as the Interest 
Equalisation Tax.  e Eurodollar market 
resulted – based in the City of London 
but taking advantage of connections to 
jurisdictions associated with the UK, but 
not in the UK proper. 
 is situation created opportunities 
for jurisdictions that had historic ties to 
major economies, but were not subject 
to their laws. Such jurisdictions had 
rudimentary  nancial infrastructure 
in place to service industries such as 
tourism in the Bahamas or the oil 
re ning industry in Curaçao.  ese 
included the Channel Islands and the 
Isle of Man in Europe, Hong Kong in 
Asia, Bermuda and other British and 
Dutch Caribbean territories in the 
Americas. As semi-autonomous units, 
these territories were not subject to the 
domestic banking reserve requirements 
that UK and US banks faced at home 
and lacked high direct taxation rates. 
 e contemporaneous labelling of 
these jurisdictions as “tax havens” (in 
“Legal, accounting, and other fi nancial services 
industries grew in these fi nancial centres as 
they developed.” 
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ns “The investments in local legal and regulatory 
infrastructure were key to the emergence of these 
jurisdictions as places where value was added 
to transactions and suitcases of cash were no 
longer welcome.”
what was originally a benign use of the 
term) captures their original role as 
havens from onerous legal requirements 
imposed elsewhere. 
Close to major  nancial markets, 
and with su  cient communication 
infrastructure, jurisdictions such as 
Jersey and the Bahamas established 
bank-oriented  nancial structures that 
legally located transactions outside 
UK and US domestic regulation. 
Jurisdictions such as Curaçao took 
advantage of tax treaties like the 1955 
extension of the US. -Netherlands treaty 
to overseas Dutch territories to create 
similar opportunities. Others such as 
the Cayman Islands explicitly set out 
to develop  nancial industries with the 
encouragement of UK colonial o  cials 
looking for long-term development 
strategies.  is  rst stage of development 
was characterised by jurisdictions using 
their historic statuses and autonomy as, 
in e ect, a walled garden into which 
economic activity could be attracted 
by o ering protection from other 
jurisdictions’ taxes and regulations.
 e erosion and then collapse of the 
Bretton Woods framework in 1971 
created further opportunity. Britain’s 
abrupt shrinkage of the sterling 
area in 1972 and the termination of 
capital and exchange controls in 1979 
created demand for ways to hedge the 
expanded currency risks of  oating 
exchange rates.  Domestic  nancial 
systems sought to limit the exposure of 
 nancial institutions as exempli ed by 
the collapses of the German Herstatt 
Bank and the US Franklin National 
Bank in 1974. In the meantime, steps 
to rebuild the international  nancial 
order, such as the 1988 Basel Accord, 
had little immediate impact on o shore 
jurisdictions. International focus was on 
the risks of expanded cross-jurisdictional 
banking, cross-border consumer 
investment funds (as seen in the 
collapse of Bernard Corn eld’s Investors 
Overseas Service), and the defaults and 
restructurings resulting from the massive 
expansion of international lending to 
developing countries in the 1970s. 
Climbing The Value Chain
Legal, accounting, and other  nancial 
services industries grew in these  nancial 
centres as they developed.  e Caymans 
went from no lawyers at all in 1960 to 
attracting Oxbridge graduates working 
at City  rms by the early 1970s—no 
doubt aided by the dismal economic 
conditions, power cuts, and strikes 
that plagued Britain during that time. 
Armed with this talent, these small island 
 nancial centres began to explore moving 
up the value chain in the 1970s and 
1980s.  ey sought to increase pro ts by 
growing both the volume of transactions 
and the proportion of each transaction 
occurring in their jurisdictions.  us, 
began the transformation of these centres 
from o shore regulatory and tax havens 
into centres where local law added value 
to transactions. 
O shore insurance markets provide 
an example. Bermuda developed a role 
as an o shore jurisdiction in the 1930s. 
In the early 1960s, US lawyer Fred 
Reiss chose Bermuda to pioneer the 
captive insurance industry, sowing the 
seeds for more complex transactions 
later.  e Cayman Islands persuaded 
Harvard’s hospital system to locate its 
medical malpractice captive there by 
passing an insurance law and taking the 
 rst steps to regulate o shore insurance. 
 e funds industry sought similar legal 
infrastructure in the 1980s, leading these 
jurisdictions to pass laws and expand 
regulatory infrastructure to support 
them.  ese laws enabled new types of 
transactions and screened out bad actors, 
making these jurisdictions attractive to 
legitimate business.
As an example, the Bahamas passed 
almost 20 major  nancial-services-
related statutes in the 1980s and 
1990s.  ese established or revised 
legal frameworks to regulate banking, 
companies and other business entities, 
funds, insurance, and trusts, and created 
the infrastructure to collaborate with 
international law enforcement e orts to 
stop money laundering and corruption. 
Other o shore jurisdictions undertook 
similarly extensive expansions of their 
legal infrastructure. 
O shore jurisdictions also expanded 
their regulatory infrastructure, 
establishing independent regulatory 
bodies outside of government, and 
separating promotional from regulatory 
e orts. Guernsey adopted this strategy 
early and created the Guernsey Financial 
Services Commission in 1987. Others 
soon followed.  Expertise for these new 
regulatory bodies drew on the British 
colonial and Commonwealth practice of 
recruiting needed experts from outside 
a jurisdiction.  is provided access to 
internationally recognised and trusted 
personnel. For example, among the 
six members of the  rst board of the 
Cayman Islands Monetary Authority 
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(established 1997) were a UK Financial 
Services Authority employee, a Canadian 
banking supervisor, and a retired senior 
partner of KPMG Peat Marwick; three 
of the six had received honours from 
the UK government. Jurisdictions 
also started case-by-case information 
exchanges with other jurisdictions 
through treaties (e.g. the Mutual Legal 
Assistance Treaty negotiated in the 1980s 
between the UK on behalf of Cayman 
and the United States).
 e investments in local legal and 
regulatory infrastructure were key to 
the emergence of these jurisdictions 
as places where value was added to 
transactions and suitcases of cash 
were no longer welcome. In contrast 
to simply enabling avoidance of 
onshore regulations or taxes, o shore 
statutes now provided for varied and 
higher quality business structures than 
those available onshore. For example, 
Guernsey pioneered the protected cell 
company structure for insurance in 
1997.  at legislation quickly spread to 
other jurisdictions and also began to be 
used for funds. Jersey’s 1984 substantive 
(and not simply procedural) Trust 
Law created a statutory framework 
that increased certainty of outcomes, 
making trusts more attractive to non-
common law jurisdiction clients.  is 
idea also spread to other o shore 
 nancial centres.
By the end of the 1990s, successful 
offshore jurisdictions offered 
distinctive value to their transactions 
and became factors in a more complex 
international regulatory environment. 
Onshore jurisdictions became 
concerned that offshore competition 
was eroding their fiscal autonomy and 
diminishing their regulatory efforts. 
Both individually and collectively 
by using the OECD to coordinate, 
onshore jurisdictions sought controls 
over what they labelled “harmful tax 
practices” in 1998.
The Expansion Of International 
Regulatory Efforts
Initially focused on the erosion of 
the tax base and money laundering of 
the proceeds of crime, international 
regulatory efforts turned to security 
concerns after 9/11. This enhanced 
regulatory regime required IFCs 
to continue adding to their legal 
infrastructure to compete for business. 
For example, the Bahamas passed 
more than 10 major statutes to address 
new international requirements after 
2001 in addition to updating existing 
laws. IFCs also had to commit 
resources to interacting with new 
regulatory regimes, such as MoneyVal 
for European jurisdictions or the 
Caribbean Financial Action Task 
Force for Caribbean jurisdictions, 
and with private standard-setters 
like the International Organization 
of Securities Commissions and 
the International Association of 
Insurance Supervisors. Jurisdictions 
were incurring new expenses without 
receiving comparable benefits or 
advantage in return.
 e transformation of obligations 
from the friction-reducing provisions 
in bilateral tax and investment treaties 
to friction-increasing provisions 
imposed as part of an international 
regulatory regime is one of the major 
di erences between the pre- and 
post-2001 worlds. Added to the 
new costs of post-9/11 international 
regulation is the more organised anti-
competitive measures from onshore 
competitors. Blacklists of “non-
cooperative jurisdictions” by individual 
governments and the European Union 
are an important example.  ese 
blacklists are rarely developed openly, 
lack clear criteria, and, in the EU’s 
case, appear to be applied preferentially 
by excluding EU members whose 
practices are hard to distinguish from 
blacklisted non-members.  e United 
States directly imposed costs on other 
jurisdictions by leveraging its position 
in the international  nancial system 
to conclude agreements with 113 
countries and jurisdictions requiring 
foreign  nancial institutions to report 
on assets held by U.S. taxpayers under 
the Foreign Account Tax Compliance 
Act (FATCA). 
The Outlook For The 2020s
 e landscape faced by IFCs in the 
2020s is demanding. Not only must 
they continue developing new products 
to maintain competitiveness, but they 
will have to meet new international 
requirements including a growing onshore 
interest in the establishment of public 
bene cial ownership registers.  e task is 
su  ciently di  cult that no jurisdiction, 
onshore or o shore, has yet produced 
an accurate and public register.  e next 
generation of international regulations 
will add to pressures to homogenise IFCs’ 
o erings and to raise their costs of doing 
business.  is emerging regulatory regime 
will require concerted e orts by IFCs 
collectively to preserve their autonomy and 
prevent their onshore competitors from 
regulating them out of business. While 
IFCs have been successful innovators 
individually, collaborating with each other 
is in its infancy. Expanding their ability 
to collaborate and compete is the next 
challenge in their development.
“The next generation of international regulations 
will add to pressures to homogenise IFCs’ offerings 
and to raise their costs of doing business.”
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